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Abstract 
Title of Dissertation: The Enhancement of Operational Safety of Engine Room 
machinery through training on CBT type of engine room 
simulator on board ships. 
Degree:   MSc 
 
This dissertation is geared towards the enhancement of safety of engine room 
machinery operations through the help of the engine room simulator of the computer 
based training type on board ships.  It examines the current training and safety 
measures required by various IMO instruments namely SOLAS, STCW 95 and the 
ISM Code, their implementation onboard and their relevance in the present 
changing time.  It identifies some of the competence related causes of engine room 
accidents/incidents associated with the operation of machineries in view of new 
technology. 
 
The study reviews various shipboard maintenance procedures and the management 
techniques that are being practiced.  It looks at the current problems associated with 
training practices onboard.  It critically assesses these practices and then suggests 
CBT as an appropriate tool for training onboard as part of the solution to some of 
these problems thus viewing the cost- benefit and risk analysis that the 
administration, management and seafarers would attain. 
 
 Common problems faced by seafarers in machinery operations and their level of 
knowledge in computer based training are presented.  Views of the manufacturers 
on the development of software so as to assist seafarers in their daily operations of 
their machineries looking at the cost, benefit and risk analyses posed on the 
administration, company and seafarers are presented.  The dissertation gives 
conclusions and recommendations that are intended to help the industry in reducing 
accidents and improve safety onboard. 
 
KEY WORDS:  Safety, Machineries Operation, Simulator, Computer Base Training, 
New Technology, Maintenance, Training, Management. Seafarers. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Safety remains a human issue, and a human solution has to be found to 
safety problem.(Boisson, 1999) 
 
 
1.1. The Beginning 
  
   
  According to the IMO resolution A.884 (21), human behaviour is 
categorized into 3 modes, i.e., skill, rule and knowledge based behaviours.  Human 
error and violation are classified into 4 modes, i.e., slip, lapse, mistake and violation.  
The background of error occurrence is assorted into 4 groups correlated with 
software, hardware, environment or live ware (Makuto UCHIDA, 2004).  The general 
cargo ship Jaipur, carrying 13,000 tons of rice to Madagascar, went out of control in 
the channel of Karachi’s Port in Pakistan and struck a bulk carrier Uang Hai 
anchored at Berth No. 1 as reported by Karachi Port Trust (KPT).  The Jaipur had 
lost its steering system.  Vossborg, a general cargo ship with containers on board 
had an engine room blackout and had to be towed to a port.  Misama, a Roll on Roll 
Off ship built in 2007 sustained rudder failure in Holtenau, Germany damaging some 
quay infrastructure and drifted back into the traffic lane (Lloyd’s List November 23 
and 27 2007).  These are a fraction of the numbers of engine room related cases 
reported.  Studies have shown that human factors such as inadequate skills, 
insufficient competence or fatigue are responsible for the majority of maritime 
accidents.   The Maritime community and International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
have been striving not only to improve the safety standards on board ships but also 
to raise the standards of seafarers who man them. 
   
  In view of this, a higher demand must be placed on those on board 
responsible for operational activities.  Also higher demand must be placed on  the 
management and the organization of the ships safety procedures (Steen, 2005).  
The International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) has provided provisions on 
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safe manning, maintenance and operation for the operators, management and 
administration.  The  International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) Section A-III/1, Chapter III also stipulates 
standards regarding the engine department.; that is, the competency and 
responsibilities of the various engine personnel. 
   
  However, the manning of ships by a lower number of crew members 
has created a situation where the technical maintenance demands all their capacity, 
so little or no time is left for on-board training by traditional methods; that is, when  
the 3rd Engineer would teach the 4th Engineer and the Chief the 2nd Engineer.  This 
chain of training exists no longer.  Training through a shore based institution gives a 
generic idea of the equipment as a component of a larger system; examples are the 
auxiliary engines, pumps, purifiers etc.  Hence many seafarers learn only their 
assigned duties relating to individual components rather than a complete system.  
Therefore, having a simulator installed on board will enable the officers to see the 
system as a collective unit and do self training.  It is known that the introduction of 
the Engine Room Simulator (ERS) is good and very resourceful for seafarers.  
Training on simulators give a clear vision of what is happening within the systems as 
scenarios can be repeated, practiced and fault findings can be shown.  This is also 
helpful for those who can not comprehend schematic diagrams well since simulators 
give a visual image of the machineries from different angles. 
   
  STCW 95 Section A-I/12 talks about standards governing the use of 
simulators for navigators.  The training as required by STCW is of an internationally 
agreed minimum level, and it is further assumed that improved navigator training 
would have a positive effect on the safety level of the vessel.  In order to maintain 
effective and efficient ship operations, minimize maritime causalities and marine 
pollution, it is of crucial importance that seafarers are continuously trained with the 
help of simulators.  As regarding to engineers, STCW 95 Section A-III/1.2 makes 
provision for training on-board but did not specify the type of training.  In any case, if 
training on a simulator is done in an institution why can this not go further onboard at 
sea when the sea becomes the final battle ground? 
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  Perhaps the administration, management and seafarers are not 
looking in the right direction to help improve engine room safety.  Maybe, a 
Computer Based Training (CBT) type of ERS, including all software of the design of 
that ship and its machineries, could be installed on board apart from the blue prints 
would be of a great help. 
 
 
 
1.2.  Inquiries Statement 
   
  What does the ship’s machinery space in times of difficulties looks 
like?   What is the experience?  What if as a chief engineer or engineering watch 
officer, in a crisis where a decision must be made; an important decision on which 
the fate of the ship and the entire crew rests on the chief or engine room watch 
officer but he/she does not know what to do?  What if the officer is placed in a 
position where he/she has no clue of how the machinery under him/her supervision 
works? What if the officer knows what to do but can not do it because he /she does 
not have the spare nor the support?  What will a senior officer do when the junior 
officers are not that experienced and he/she does not have the time to help teach 
them?  How will these situations be arrested? So many questions and so many 
answers! 
   
  Often, when in this sort of situation, an engineer is usually under 
severe pressure to restore the system within the shortest possible time. To arrive at 
a solution the engineer may rely on one, or a combination of the following: 
? The equipment’s service manual or blue print 
? Experience 
? Trial and error etc 
Now, what if the system manual cannot be reached under certain circumstances or 
if he/she has never experienced this particular system failure or the blue print is not 
comprehensible?  No chief  engineer would like to be placed in such a situation 
hence he/she must make attempts to solve the problem, obviously by trying various 
possible solutions until he/she restores the system to its working condition.  
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Sometimes the Chief can fail and such failure can be catastrophic with severe 
casualties.  Who takes the blame (Obara, 2002)? 
1.3. Purpose of the research 
   
  In the last decades shipboard technology has changed extensively, 
mainly in the form of automatic controls which demand higher and updated skills 
and knowledge from seafarers.  Besides these demands technology has had an 
impact on the daily operations in the engine room.  Operations with reduced 
shipboard personnel, stringent regulations, competitiveness and commercial 
pressures which are common onboard hence there is virtually no time for training 
onboard which is  a traditional method of developing operational skills. 
   
   On the other hand, 85% of accidents onboard have been attributed 
to the human error.  Notwithstanding, a comprehensive view of the circumstances of 
these accidents depends on many different actors.  It may be deficiencies in the 
safety rules issued by authorities or non-observance of valid rules.  The cause of an 
accident may also rest with the company such as deficiencies in its manuals, in the 
education, use of unqualified personnel and reluctance to use the right training 
techniques.  
   
  In view of these demands that the new technology has placed on  
seafarers this research is geared towards examining the current training and safety 
measures through the various IMO instruments namely STCW 95, SOLAS and the 
ISM Code, their implementation on board and relevance in these changing times.  
This research is intended to know and identify the causes of engine room problems 
with the operation of machineries in view of new technologies.  It suggests an 
appropriate tool for training onboard as part of the solution to some of these 
problems with the cost, benefit and risk analysis that the administration, 
management and seafarers would attain.  The suggestion for the training tool is 
through the help of ERS of the CBT type.  The question is why the CBT simulator 
and not any other training aid such as video, posters or audio tapes?  One of the 
main reasons of suggesting CBT was that it is interactive.  Moverover, CBT is more 
effective for training and education over these other mutilmedia.  In that, videos and  
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other media can only broadcast information which may be effective for some training 
and education, it often lacks one of the major elements required by many individuals 
for effective training and education and that is CBT interactivities. The major 
objective of this simulated programme is to achieve safe and effective operation. As 
a device it offers a potential for improved efficiency in many tasks using the mental 
and physical processes.   
   
Finally the research also expands on finding answers to the following questions: 
1. What are the views of administration, management and the operators 
(seafarers) as to the level of risk? 
2. How is safety incorporated into simulator training? 
3. How will the training be carried out by seafarers on board? 
4. How can ERS be used to improve safety? 
 
As stated, maybe the administration, management and seafarers are 
not looking in the right direction in helping to improve engine room safety.  A solution 
could be having the CBT simulator installed onboard with all the necessary functions 
as a training aid for smooth operations of important sub-systems in the engine room.  
This will be a good opportunity if introduced for engineers as many of these 
equipments are not touched unless there is a breakdown. 
 
 Chapter two examines the training and safety measures of the 
various IMO instruments namely through STCW 78/95, SOLAS and the ISM Code.  
Chapter three identifies the root causes of engine room accidents, whereas chapter 
four gives an apparent solution to reducing these accidents. Chapter five looks at 
the cost-benefit and risk assessment of the CBT simulator as a training tool installed 
onboard.   Finally, chapter six gives the conclusions and recommendations to this 
research. 
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1.4. Research Methodology 
   
  The research methodology was structured into three different 
elements.  A literature review combining all relevant material related to the topic, 
much of which was found in the World Maritime University (WMU) Library and 
Malmö City library whereas a portion was sourced online sources.  The second 
element was through observations and interviews during the field trips organised by 
the University, mainly to two major manufacturers of simulators namely: Marine Soft 
and Kongsberg.  A glimpse at Seagull as one of the programmers of the software 
was examined.  The third and final element was a questionnaire,  the purpose of 
which was to have  feedback from  the engine room personnel with sea-going 
experience about the various machineries they have worked on.  The reasons for 
doing this were to see the common trend on the line of difficulties they have faced in 
dealing with their machineries, and then formulate a question for the manufacturers 
as to whether software for training on a CBT simulator can be designed so as to 
alleviate the difficulties that the seafarers faced. 
 
 
1.5. Limitations 
 
A technical research of such kind needs a great deal of on the job 
contact with seafarers onboard various ships.  Unfortunately,  time constraints for 
the completion of this research and the unavailability of cash to visit seafarers on 
site became the strongest limitations for this research.   Hence, the information 
gathered was limited to students at WMU, ex-seafarers and seafarers in various 
locations namely Europe, Asia, the United States and Africa.  Limitations were also 
placed on the questionnaire due to its technical nature.  Therefore, it could not be 
widely distributed.  Also on its technicality it was specifically designed for engine 
room personnel with at least a sea going experience. 
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Chapter Two 
  
  
2.  Revision of STCW 78, as amended 
   
  Almost every Convention, its amendment or revision is a reflection of 
an accident, innovation of technology and evolution of time; the revision of the 
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW), is no exception. 
This is the first international convention to define qualification requirements applying 
to ship’s officers and other seagoing personnel. The convention was something of a 
milestone when it was adopted; it represented an inevitable compromise and an  
assumption of good intent by those countries which ratified it (Dearsley, 1995). The 
STCW 78 had had its setback and was amended in 1995.  STCW78/95 set  a 
framework by introducing  minimum standards of knowledge, understanding and 
proficiency in specified competencies from the viewpoint of safety and pollution (R. 
Prasad, 2008), thus providing three levels of responsibilities; namely Management, 
Operation and Support. 
  
  The amended version of STCW 78 had made so many provisions 
and specifications that some of these provisions had been over emphasised but at 
the same time leaving many under emphasised so that there is now a need for a 
comprehensive review.  Over the last two decades there has been extensive 
changes in shipboard technology in all working areas of the ship (R. Prasad, 2008);  
technologies that involve a high degree of precision in automatic control, by which 
the need for adequate  manning was compensated but demanded higher and up to 
date seafarer skills.   
   
  According to STW 38 (IMO, 2007), there was an impending need to 
have a comprehensive review of STCW 78, as amended, since there were 
numerous  accidents at sea, due to  seafarers’ unfamiliarization with equipment, 
modern technologies, negligence and so on.  Various parties to the convention 
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agreed that the review should only embrace the following principles:  retain the 
structure and goals of the 1995 revision; do not down scale existing standards; do 
not amend the articles of the convention; address inconsistencies, interpretations, 
outdated provisions, MSC instructions, clarification already issued and technological 
advances; address requirements for effective communication; provide for flexibility in 
terms of compliance and for required levels for training and certification and 
watchkeeping arrangements due to innovation in technology; address the special 
character and circumstances of short sea shipping and the offshore industry; and 
address security-related issues.  
   
  Finally, a number of recommendations had been made through the 
promulgation of a number of IMO circulars which have provided further guidance to 
Administrations, training providers, seafarers and stakeholders to enhance the 
benefits to be gained and also strengthen the framework for the implementation of 
uniform standards globally.  In March 2008, the STW sub-committee met and 
commenced the comprehensive review as instructed.  The associated work is 
expected to be completed in 2010 (Fuazudeen, 2008). 
 
 
2.1.  STCW 95, Section A-III/1-2  
   
  Today’s ship owners, managers and operators are under constant 
pressure to demonstrate that the vessels which they operate are safe both in the 
material sense and with respect to the ability of the crew to operate them safely 
(Seatec, 2003).   Training on the job is an essential ingredient in achieving this. 
  
   STCW 95, Section A-III/1-2.1 (On-board training) states that the 
administration and the company should: 
 “Ensure that during the required period of seagoing service the candidate 
receives systematic practical training and experience in the tasks, duties and 
responsibilities of an officer in charge of an engine-room watch, taking into account 
the guidance given a section B-III/1 of this Code;”  
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  However, this section of the Code is not so effective due to numerous 
reasons.  The faster turn around of ships with short port stays coupled with the lack 
of social interaction on board due to reduced crew size and culture differences  (R. 
Prasad, 2008); the concept of continuous training has not been used within the 
shipping industries because of short contracts, uncertainty of retention and the 
movement of crew members between the vessels within company (Ign T. E. Berg & 
Skotgard, 1996), these are just a few  of the reasons training has been reduced 
onboard. 
  
  To re-enforce this section, and thus make it more effective the 
attitudes toward safety must be embraced by the owners, administration and 
operators.  Training is an expensive venture, and ship owners should not be so 
short sighted in undertaking such venture.  The initial cost of training maybe higher 
but they pay the industry and ship owners back in terms of competency and safety 
of operations.  Ship-owners, administrations and seafarers should combine their 
efforts to enable the delivery of training courses on-board so as to promote and 
enhance seafarers’ skills for safe and efficient shipboard operations.  The 
collaboration of these three parties would certainly aid to minimize maritime 
causalities and raise seafarer’s competency standards in order to reach the goal of 
safer, secure ships and cleaner oceans (Hanafi & Fouda, 2004). 
 
 
2.1.1 STCW 78, as amended Resolution 8.3  
  
  Resolution 8.3 asks to “encourage all officers to participate actively in 
the training of junior personnel”.  There must be a need for the industry to adhere to 
this resolution; however, due to the innovations in technology it is no longer effective.  
The manning of ships now calls for a smaller number of crew members which 
creates a situation where the technical maintenance demands all their capacity and 
little or no time is left for on-board training by traditional methods. 
  
  A traditional method where the 3rd Engineer would teach the 4th 
Engineer and the Chief the 2nd Engineer, this chain of training does not exist any 
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more. The reason could be two-folded.  On one hand, the number of ships has been 
reduced due to the increase in the individual ship’s tonnage; on the other, the 
development of technology and the increase of labour costs reduce the number of 
seamen on a vessel, while the demand on a seaman’s personal qualifications and 
levels has been raised (Futian, 1999).  A well-trained crew is an essential part of a 
safe and effective operational ship hence if training is lacking onboard, problems are 
deemed to exist in all areas. One of those areas is within the machinery space. 
 
2.2.  The Machinery Space Associated Problems 
   
  A ship’s machinery space is where the main engine(s), generator(s), 
compressors, pumps, fuel/lubrication oil purifiers and other major machinery are 
located.  It is sometimes referred to as the ‘Engine Room’.  A lot of accidents 
associated with human factors occur in the machinery space, including near misses, 
but unfortunately only a fraction is reported. 
  
  The ISM Code requires that the safety management system should 
include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and hazardous 
situations are reported to the company, investigated and analysed with the objective 
of improving safety and pollution prevention (ISM, 2002). 
  
  The statistics have shown that 80% of all accidents can be attributed 
to the human factor.  There is no such thing as a person who is accident abstained; 
human errors affect us all without fear or favour and lack of training and experience 
make people ignorant of the correct procedure. 
   
  Within the Engine Room space various factors that are associated 
with incidents and accidents are improper training, not following procedures, quality 
of hardware, inadequate design and maintenance management, error enforcing 
conditions, poor housekeeping, incompatible goals, poor organization, and 
ineffective communication. It is well known that technological development in the 
maritime field is proceeding rapidly.   Modern shipbuilding can be characterized by a 
tendency towards well-equipped and faster ships of different types, specially built to 
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be manned by small crews.  The SOLAS, STCW and Load Lines conventions 
contain specific provisions for designing, building, equipping and maintaining ships 
to meet the demands of safety,  both for the ship itself and for all those on board 
(Steen, 2005). To supplement these conventions, there is a reference code of safe 
working practices on almost all merchant ships for seafarers to consult frequently, 
but how many do consult this code before undertaking a task? 
 
2.3.  Analysis of SOLAS, Chapter II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.10 
   
  The technical manuals, drawings, plans and tables of the engine 
room and the machineries are very important for familiarization, guidance and 
regulation purposes.   SOLAS, Chapter II-1, Part C, Regulation 26.10 states that 
“Operating and maintenance instructions and engineering drawings for ship 
machinery and equipment essential to the safe operation of the ship shall be written 
in a language understandable by those officers and crew members who are required 
to understand such information in the performance of their duties.” 
   
  Recently, a tanker (AMBA BRAVANSE) was held in position by four 
tugs off the coast of the Shetlands while the crew struggle to rectify a fault in the 
ship’s cooling water system. Another separate accident was on the Roll on Roll Off 
ship (VARDEHORN) that went aground when one of her thrusters had broken off 
(Lloyd's List, 2008).  Even though, there were operational and maintenance 
procedures available these accidents still occurred.  However, design failures can 
not totally be erased from these problems.   
  
  Some of the designs were vulnerable to predictable human failings.   
For instance, the design of a single skin fuel injection pipe, that is, when broken, fuel 
can easily splash onto hot surfaces and then cause fire.   Indeed, SOLAS Chapter 
II-Part B Regulation 4-2.2.5.2 compensated for this by allowing a double skinned 
fuel pipe system so that fuel is contained from the high-pressure line in case of 
failure.  This new system also includes means for the collection of leaks and an 
alarm in case of a fuel line failure.     
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  Deficiency in design is a handicap that hinders engineers’ 
endeavours to ensure crew safety.  To avoid this, the design process must be 
managed effectively to ensure that the human factor is considered at design 
conception, and throughout all the design stages, including final installation and 
testing (Withington, 2001).  The lessons learned from here is that accidents could be 
reduced if the operators were better trained, effectively designed and maintenance 
procedures adhered to.  Good design is most likely successful in preventing 
accidents.  
  
  However, due to the modern technologies employed in today’s ships, 
the industry should go a little step further in enhancing these instructions, and 
guidance for the safety of ships and the seafarer. 
 
 
2.4. Implementing and Supplementing SOLAS Regulation 26.10 
   
  The implementation of SOLAS regulation 26.10 had been enforced 
onboard every ship; it had also been re-emphasized through out the ISM Code and 
STCW 95 Section A, Table A-III/1.  However, with these regulations the accidents 
and incidents within the machinery space have not declined.  Almost all the studies 
and maritime disaster inquiries conclude that human error accounts for more that 
80% of marine accidents.    Many accidents were caused by poor maintenance or 
the mal-adjustment of equipment which did not appear to comply with the existing 
provisions of SOLAS regulation III/20 (Operational readiness, maintenance and 
Inspections), while some followed failures of communication and /or procedures.  
The causes of such accidents need to be established and addressed as a matter of 
urgency (IMO, 2001).  Is it because of poor equipment design, poor judgement; 
inadequate information or generally or the lack of adequate technical knowledge?   
   
  The ship has become so complicated that it needs a high degree of 
professionalism at all levels.  It is quite expedient that SOLAS regulation 26.10 has 
been backed up by the ISM Code Part A-10, but this also has to be supplemented 
by the introduction of a computerized system to help the operators.  This should 
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include diagrams, drawings of machineries and operational procedures which can 
easily be depicted on a CBT simulator.  
  
 
2.5.  ISM Code as it Relates to Maintenance of Equipments 
 
  The ISM Code Part A – 10 talks about the “Maintenance of the Ship and 
Equipment” for the administration, company and seafarers to implement.  
Implementation of the Code is good but is it effective in reducing accidents?   Part A 
– 10.3 states that “The Company should establish procedures in its safety 
management system to identify equipment and technical systems the sudden 
operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations.  The safety 
management system should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the 
reliability of such equipment or systems.  These measures should include the 
regular testing of stand-by arrangements and equipment or technical systems that 
are not in continuous use.”  However, statistics still show that 80% of accidents at 
sea are due to human error.  Is it that the operators ignore the regulations or should 
there be additional support to warn these operators about the consequences of not 
adhering to these regulations? 
    
   The Norwegian class society (DNV) made a survey covering 300 
seafarers.   During this survey over 50% of the seafarers admitted that they had 
broken safety instructions frequently.  This clearly demonstrates the safety risk in 
shipping.  On the other hand, the maritime community and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) are striving not only to improve safety standards on board ships 
but also to raise the standards of seafarers who man them. 
   
   There seems to be a conflict. Whist the IMO is trying to improve 
situations by putting higher demand on the various managements and 
administrations to improve safety standards onboard, seafarers sometimes do 
something else.  Should management/administration look in a different direction to 
promote safety on board or are the seafarers too tired of looking at instructions, 
diagrams and blueprints? 
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  A recent study, carried out by a group of independent experts on the 
impact and effectiveness of the ISM Code concluded that ISM Code compliance 
could be made easier through the reduction of the administrative process by 
streamlining and reducing the paperwork that supports ISM compliance, particularly 
concerning the Safety Management System (SMS).  It further laid emphasis on the 
use of technology and information technology (IT) and  the reduction of paperwork,  
(Seatec, 2003). 
 
2.6.  Synopsis of Simulators 
    
   The advancement in technology has meant a faster turn-round in port 
placing further demands upon the master, who does not have the manpower 
support today to provide watchkeeping and operational backup in difficult situations 
as in the past.  The unmanned machinery space has increasingly shifted monitoring 
operations to the bridge and led to the integration of navigation and engineering 
functions on the bridge (Muirhead, 2008). 
   
   The Simulator is defined as a mechanical, electro-mechanical, or 
computer device for producing a realistic representation of an event or a system.  It 
is used where the real equipment is very expensive and inaccessible, and to train 
operators in safety (Song, 1994).  The DNV placed the simulators into classifications 
due to the limitation in tasks that each simulator can perform. The important training 
role marine simulators can play in raising safety standards has been given 
increased recognition through the incorporation of this advanced technology in the 
recently amended 1978 STCW 95 (Fisher & Muirhead, 2001). 
   
  The levels of simulator systems that can be distinguished are 
suggested in the design drafts and are categorized as: Category 1 which is the Full 
Mission  type (FM); Category 2 is the Multi-Task type (MT); Category 3 is the 
Limited Task type (LT) and Category 4 is the Special Task type (ST).  However, the 
purpose of the classification of a simulator is to ensure that simulations provide an 
appropriate level of physical and behavioural realism in accordance with 
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training/assessment objectives as stated in the STCW code Section A-I/12.  
Category 1 (FM) are used for full immersion training with maximum possible control 
of the simulation environment.  They have a complete bridge system installed, 
including sound and realistic visuals and are capable of advanced manoeuvring and 
pilotage training in restricted waterways.  Category 2 (MT) are capable of simulating 
a total navigation environment, but excluding the capability for advance restricted 
water manoeuvring.  Category 3 (LT) are capable of simulating an environment for 
limited (blind bridge) navigation and collision advance training.  Category 4 (ST) are 
appropriate to provide multiple trainee stations for familiarization training in 
preparation of a more comprehensive simulator (Cross, 2000). 
    
  It can be said that any dynamic process or complex operational 
equipment is a suitable model for a simulator system.  Some of the types of 
simulators in use in the maritime and related industries include: navigation 
equipment simulator, communication equipment simulator, ship handling simulator, 
dynamic positioning simulator, ballast control simulator, propulsion plant simulator, 
refrigeration plant simulator and drill technology simulator.   
   
  However, under the mandatory part of the Code, parties are required 
to ensure that the aims and objectives of simulator-base training are defined within 
an overall training program with the emphasis on objectives and tasks relating as 
closely as possible to shipboard practices.  Table 1 below, indicates the tasks that 
can be performed by the various simulators as stipulated in STCW 95: 
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Table 1:  Simulators Tasks as stipulated by STCW 95 
                         
 
      Source:(Cross, 2000) 
 
 
2.7.  Computer Based Training (CBT) Simulator 
   
  CBT can simply come in the form of a desk top computer with 
graphics and text or with more enhanced facilities such as audio facilities.  It is like 
an interactive video.  It is also a generic term to describe how computer-run software 
can be used in support of training applications;  these may include initial training, or 
for imparting or reinforcing underpinning knowledge.  CBT can be used to review a 
topic or procedure already learned, or it can be used as a readily available reference 
source (IMO, 2002). 
   
  The need for improved and more efficient training methods has been 
stated by administrators, shipping company executives and seafarers themselves.  
A number of isolated minor improvements have been proposed, developed and 
tested.  A basic conclusion is that these improvements have made no major 
difference with respect to the competence levels of ratings or officers.  Hence, the 
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introduction of a video training tool had been mentioned by some companies so as 
to get the full value of new training tools as an integral part of the seafarers’ living 
environment (Ing T.E. Berg, 1996).    
   
  The working environment onboard has become more complex over 
the last few decades with a drastic reduction in manning levels, increase in the use 
of automation, unmanned machinery spaces, aging fleet and highly congested sea 
lanes. For example, at first the conventional method information processing was 
done by the operator.  That is the operator had to be in the process at every stage 
but the operator had a limited processing ability.  Some of these limitations included 
reading and understanding, external and internal stresses.  Therefore, it will be quite 
important to bring in incentives to help in the modernization of ship’s operation so as 
to reduce human error.  Hence, the deployment of a CBT simulator will be a good 
supplement for training onboard.  With the aid of the CBT simulator for the engine 
room, some of these complex problems especially within the machinery space will 
be reduced.    CBT has the ability to rapidly store and recover information, respond 
to the user’s interaction, and integrate multi-media applications which can 
incorporate visual, audio and physical stimulus thus providing rapid operational 
knowledge and developing operator experience.   
 
 
2.8.   CBT simulator onboard as a training tool 
   
  The Seafarers, Training, Assessment and Operations are the key 
words.  Knowledge is the basis for all technical solutions.  Extensive, well designed 
relevant, up-to-date and adequate training play an important role in the safe, 
economical operation of the ship and its machinery and in controlling arising 
problems.  The shipping industry has gone through the following changes during the 
last few decades; it has involved the reduction in manning levels along with 
technical sophistication on board resulting in socio-technical problems.  The 
increase in international competition, requiring ships and its machinery to be in 
optimum condition at all times and the increased use of automation and unmanned 
machinery space (Ray, 1999). 
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  Traditional forms of training, using time spent in the work place as a 
way of ensuring competency, are based on the principle that through a series of 
experiences, a trainee will absorb sufficient knowledge and develop adequate skills 
so that when presented with a novel situation, he/she will be able to deal with it 
effectively.  This type of experiential learning relies on a sufficient length of time for 
enough sets of circumstances to arise, and a sufficient length of time for reflection 
and synthesis before an individual takes on responsibility (MSA, 2000).  Today, 
modern technologies, fast turn around and the manning of ships by a smaller 
number of crew members has created a situation where there is little or no time left 
for training onboard by traditional methods.  Hence, there must be alternative 
means of training onboard if the industry wants a safer, more secure operation in 
cleaner oceans. The simplest and less expensive means is through the CBT 
simulator.  However, CBT, as any other training tool has its advantages and 
disadvantages as seen in table 2. 
 
 
2.8.1 Advantages and Disadvantages of CBT as a training tool 
onboard 
 
Table 2: Advantages and Disadvantages of CBT 
 Advantages of CBT Disadvantages of CBT 
1  conveniently available  Too convenient, sometimes leads to 
reduced interest. 
2 Trainee can work at his/her own 
pace 
The pace of training must be a course 
design feature.  If the course is too slow 
the trainee will be bored and if too fast 
are likely to retain less knowledge. 
3 Trainee can often go back over 
instructions and procedures to 
reinforce  understanding 
Trainee must be motivated to progress 
as quickly as possible. 
4 Three-dimensional images of 
equipments and structures can be 
depicted clearly to be understood 
The designers must assume that the 
target audience can assimilate the 
information displayed. 
5 The software can also be explained 
in many languages 
Care must be taken in translating training 
material to ensure that the intended 
message does not change through the 
translation process which will pose a 
significant risk 
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6 Training can be designed for multi-
level training so that the same 
course is suitable for a range of 
target audiences or to let the trainee 
progress to higher knowledge levels 
in controlled stages 
 
7 Training records are easily stored, 
and managed for audit and 
verification purposes 
 
8 Long-term knowledge retention can 
be higher with CBT than many other 
means of training 
Computer equipment and software can 
have compatibility problems and some 
means of proving user support is 
required 
9 The help function will assist the 
trainee in case of difficulty in finding 
solutions 
Computer can only provide training 
where the objective is to transfer 
knowledge; computer can not transfer 
practical skills to trainee 
10 CBT is less expensive and  most 
importantly, it can be used for self 
training 
There is limited ability for group learning 
     Source : (IMO, 2002) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
3.  Safety Awareness within the Engine Room 
  
   
  ‘Safety First’ is made as a sign that is quite visible almost in all 
engine rooms. But what does this mean and is it really enforced?  The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has long been promoting safety of life and property at 
sea along with environmental protection. Today, we now have a new safety 
management code (ISM Code) instructing the industry that the most important 
matter to be addressed, both ashore and afloat, is that safety must come first 
(Anderson, 2003).  Moreover, this Code requires operators to embrace safety as an 
integral part of their policy and working practices but gives no descriptive rules to 
say how this must be done.  
  
  Safety is defined as the control of accidental loss.  Accidents will 
occur because a problem that was not adequately defined; a problem whose 
consequences were not fully perceived, or simply a problem that was not considered 
to exist (Kuhlman, 1977).  However, within the engine room the immediate cause of 
an accident may appear to be equipment related or human-related.  Nevertheless, a 
need for a pro-active, holistic approach to safety must be considered. The pro-active 
approach is the identification of potential dangers of accidents which requires the 
involvement of all on board (Rajendra Prasad, 1999). This may significantly change 
the way ships are run and operated thus safety awareness is the very first step to 
this approach. 
   
  How can safety awareness be carried out in the engine room?  These 
methods have been used on board ships and were found  to be good and effective 
(Lavery, 1990). 
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• Films:         
The showing of safety films is good so as to keep the crew abreast with 
safety matters. 
 
• Posters:   
 This can be an effective method of bringing particular dangers to the 
 attention of engine room members. 
 
• Informal talks:  
 The idea of having a safety meeting once a month to build up crew 
 morale is effective. 
 
• Warning and Working Signs:  
 This serves as a notice to the other crew members. 
 
• Maintenance of Safety Equipment:  
 It is advisable to keep a record of the dates and work done on any 
 machinery. 
 
• Permit to Work system:  
For dangerous work or hot work a permit must be issued which is  also 
effective. 
   
  The whole aim of this safety awareness is to create a safety culture 
which will reduce accidents, damage, personal injury and lost-time incidents in 
competitive, commercial ship operations. 
 
3.1.  Developing a Safety Culture 
   Safety culture is more than merely avoiding accidents or even 
reducing the number of accidents, although these are likely to be the most 
apparent measures of success.  The quality and effectiveness of training will 
play a significant part in determining the attitude and performance and the 
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professionalism that the seafarer will subsequently demonstrate in his, or her, 
work.  The attitude adopted will, in turn, be shaped to a large degree by the 
“culture” of the company (Hanza-Pazara & Arsenie, 2007). The product of an 
individual, group values, attitudes, perception, competencies to, style and 
proficiency of an organization’s safety management are the words used to 
describe Safety Culture. 
   
  Tor Christian Mathiesen in 1994 defined safety culture as “describing 
a situation where owners are engaged in a continuous process to improve safety 
and see this as their management philosophy and operational mode to reduce 
losses” and he added that “this implies focus on the entire management chain, 
from the board room to the ship.”  As a supporter of the safety culture he 
emphasized that “to control safety is the answer to regain credibility for the 
shipping industry” (Velga, 2001). 
    
  Safety Culture is not only a way of complying with organizational 
rules but rather a way of life, individual inner motivation and an acceptance to do 
the right thing.   Therefore, to develop this culture onboard certain parameters 
must be put in place.  These parameters are in the form of five different 
components; Informed, Reporting, Just, Flexible and Learning Cultures (Reason, 
1997). 
  
   Informed Culture involves creating a safety information system that 
collects analyses and disseminates information from accidents and near-misses 
as well as regular pro-active check on the system’s vital signs. Reporting culture 
depends on the atmosphere whereby the people are willing or prepared to report 
their errors and near misses without fear of being punished. Just Culture 
involves an atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged even rewarded, 
for providing essential safety-related information.  Flexible Culture means the 
shifting from that conventional hierarchical mode into a professional structure of 
somewhat being more friendly.  Learning culture which involves the willingness 
to draw the right conclusions from its safety information and implement major 
reforms when the needs are indicated (Mejia, 2008).  In establishing safety 
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culture within the engine room, the crew must start with realistic expectations, be 
patient but persistent in their implementation, target the human element in the 
safety equation and above all be intolerant of substandard practices   Finally, the 
objective of developing a safety culture is that it should aim at inspiring the 
seafarers towards firm and effective self-regulation and to encourage their 
personal ownership of establishing best practice (Iarossi, 1999). With this in 
mind it will be quite understandable that the approaches in handling machinery 
onboard should/must be scrutinized. 
 
3.2.  Machinery Maintenance Approach in the Engine Room 
   
  The old saying ‘prevention is better than cure’ is extremely important 
to mariners due to the isolated nature of the employment and to the lack of 
immediate repair and spares facilities.  Good preventive maintenance means 
that large sums of money are not wasted on emergency spares, overtime, 
delays, and operational incidents (Lavery, 1990).  The maritime industry 
recognizes three basic approaches to monitoring and maintaining machinery 
and these are; Reactive, Preventive and Predictive.  The Reactive approach 
may monitor machinery operating using certain condition monitoring 
measurements, but utilizes very little or no maintenance of machinery until that 
machinery exhibits operating problems or fail to operate.  The Preventive 
approach monitors machinery by tracking calendar or running hour elapsed time.  
The Predictive approach to maintenance gathers certain condition monitoring 
measurements regularly (Alexander, Starr, & O'Donnell, 1990).  
   
  There are still some shipping companies engaging in the reactive 
approach towards maintenance.  Having a reactive engine room crew means 
that the equipment is running the plant and not the crew.  Sad to say that those 
working with the reactive approach rely on the saying ‘when it is not broken, why 
fix it.’  Reactive maintenance is also known as corrective maintenance. That is, 
this approach is mainly a response to machine breakdowns.  If the equipment 
breaks down, they fix it as quickly as possible and then run it until it breaks down 
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again(Jarrett, 2004).  This is an unpredictable approach which sometimes can 
disrupt the smooth operation of the ship. 
   
   Preventive maintenance encompasses activities, including 
adjustments, replacement and basic cleanliness, that forestall machine 
breakdowns. Preventive activities are primarily condition based (Laskiewicz, 
2005).  This approach is done on the actions performed on a time-or machine-
run-based schedule that detect, preclude, or mitigate the degradation of a 
component or system with the aim of sustaining or extending its useful life 
through controlling degradation to an acceptable level.  Many manufacturers’ 
instructions are based on this approach.  Hence, a full set of maintenance 
manuals and associated documentation issued by the manufacturer will be 
available on board for use in all operations involved in the inspection, 
maintenances adjustment and resetting of the machinery (IMO, 2006).  Hence, 
the guidance is in the form of a checklist, diagram, table, or a procedure on the 
performance of any given task that should be done on that machinery. 
   
  Finally the Predictive approach is almost similar to the preventive but 
differs in the sense that it is unplanned and unscheduled.  It involves performing 
maintenance on a machine in advance of the time a failure would occur if the 
maintenance were not performed.  That is, it involves vibration, sound, 
temperature, lubricant analysis programs to forecast the machinery conditions 
and then assesses and decides on the machinery maintenance scheduling. 
   
  These three approaches have their pros and cons depending on 
which type of management is executing such an approach.  Therefore, for 
evaluating the various methods one needs to weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages and then conclude. 
   
 
3.3.  Evaluating the Approaches of Machinery maintenance 
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Table 3:  Advantages and Disadvantages of machinery maintenance    
APPROACH ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
Reactive • Low Cost 
• Less Staff 
• Increase cost due to 
unplanned downtime of 
equipment 
• Increased labour cost, 
especially if overtime is 
needed 
• Cost involved with repair 
or replacement of 
equipment 
• Inefficient use of staff 
resources 
Preventive • Cost effective in many 
capital intensive 
processes 
• Flexibility allows for the 
adjustment of 
maintenance period 
• Increase component life 
cycle 
• Energy savings 
• Reduced equipment or 
process failure 
• Estimated 12% to 18% 
cost savings over reactive 
maintenance program 
 
• Catastrophic failures still 
likely to occur 
• Labour intensive 
• Includes performance of 
un-needed maintenance 
• Potential for incidental 
damage to components in 
conducting un-needed 
maintenance 
Predictive  • Increased component 
operational life/availability 
• Allows for pre-emptive 
corrective actions 
• Decrease in equipment or 
process downtime 
• Better product quality 
• Improved worker and 
environmental safety 
• Improved worker moral. 
• Energy savings 
• Estimated 8% to 12% 
cost savings over 
preventive maintenance 
program 
 
• Increased investment in 
diagnostic equipment. 
• Increased investment in 
staff training 
• Savings potential not 
readily seen by 
management 
 
Source: (Mitchell, 1998)   
  In evaluating the three approaches it was discovered that many 
companies tend to use the preventive approach because it reduces the cost, it is 
 26  
flexible and increases the component’s life cycle.  However, in most instances, 
there is little recognition of the idea that these three approaches to monitoring 
and maintaining machinery may be integrated to work together, to the benefit 
from an overall comprehensive machinery maintenance program.  If such 
integration takes place it will eliminate unexpected equipment failure; eliminate 
unnecessary maintenance activities; plan maintenance and repair activities to 
minimize loss of operating income. There is a need to ensure personnel are 
qualified to manage the program, perform the required maintenance and 
interpret condition monitoring measurements (Alexander et al., 1990).  The 
Comprehensive Machinery Program comprises Personnel Training; Machinery 
History; Equipment Condition Monitoring; Maintenance & Repair Scheduling and 
Spare Parts Inventory Control which all have a common relationship.  The 
personnel training form the basis of support in enabling the effective and efficient 
implementation of the program.  Good record keeping is an essential part of the 
machinery history.  The equipment condition monitoring provides input for the 
machinery history in a quantitative form by analysing the determination of 
maintenance or repairs.  Maintenance and repair scheduling is optimized by a 
knowledgeable personnel who must utilize the machinery history.  Finally, the 
spare parts and inventory control is enhanced in coordination with maintenance 
and repair scheduling.  
   
  If there is such a brilliant program put into place in the engine room 
why over the last two decades has the accident rate risen so high?  Even though 
the program embeds personnel training there is still the human element which 
accounts for 80% of onboard accidents. 
 
3.4.  Human Errors in Engine Room Safety 
   
  According to the IMO resolution A. 884(21), human behaviour is 
categorized into 3 modes, i.e., skill, rule and knowledge base behaviours.  
Human error is classified into 4 modes, i.e., slip, lapse, mistake and violation.  
The background of error occurrence is sorted into 4 groups correlated to 
software, hardware, environment or liveware (M. Uchida, 2004).  It is quite 
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explainable that accidents/incidents occur in the engine room due to various 
reasons and it is imperative to take appropriate actions to prevent or reduce 
these accidents/incidents. 
   
  Slip is an unintentional action where the failure involves attention.  
Lapse is an unintentional action where the failure involves memory.  Whereas, 
mistake is an intentional action, but there is no deliberate decision to act against 
a rule or plan.  There are errors in planning. Violation is a planning failure where 
a deliberate decision to act against a rule or plan has been made (Reason, 
1999). Below is a box diagram showing the various errors and the 
immediate cause that will lead to various circumstances. 
 
 
     Figure 1:SLMV Diagram  
    Source: (Reason, 1999) 
  However,  human error is not just about humans neither is the human 
factor about humans alone.  It is about how features of people’s tools and tasks and 
working environment systematically influence human performance (Dekker, 2006).   
In 80%-90% of injuries, some type of unsafe behaviour was the final common 
pathway of the incident (Krause, Hidley, & Hodson, 1990).    For instance, an engine 
crew member tightening a bolt suffered a contusion from striking a hand against 
something when the wrench slipped.  This contusion caused the crew member so 
much pain that he/she could not work until the hand had healed.  The probable 
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cause of this accident could be that the bolt was rusted, wrong seating of the wrench 
on the bolt, bad ergonomics of the tools design or wrong positioning, or wrong 
torque applied.  Whatever the scenario is, unfortunately, it is all brought down to 
human failure.  
   
  There are other accidents that happen within the engine room that 
are concluded to be human errors. Examples, electric shock, caused by defective 
installations and equipment or faulty insulation, hand injuries caused by sharp tools, 
slipping of tools use of faulty hand tools, etc.; slips, trips   causes by greasy flooring, 
poor housekeeping or bad weather; work shop accidents due to rotating machinery, 
belts, shaft, cable, pulley etc. among others are accident/incidents that are not 
considered serious. 
   
  No matter what the circumstances are, it can all be traced to human 
failure.  The machine is designed, built and operated by man.  Thus a failure of the 
machine is really a failure of man. 
 
3.5.   Interaction of Seafarers, Machineries and Environment 
   
  The design of a ship should aim at reducing the likelihood of human 
error, in that the machineries should not be complicated in handling so as to 
accommodate human error.  If errors are not self-evident, their occurrence should 
be clearly signalled to the crew.  Maritime safety therefore involves the integration of 
three elements.  Man (Seafarer), Machine and Environment into one system.  Each 
element influences the other to varying degrees and the elements are often depend 
on each other.  A hazard in one element can start a chain reaction leading to an 
accident in which all three elements are involved.  Many of the hazards that occur 
are brought about by difficulties at the interface between these three elements.   
   
   Figure 2 below depicts man and machine within the environment and 
tries to explain that accidents caused by machines in shipping over the years have 
dropped while that of man is still rising.   
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    Figure 2: Man and Machine causes 
    Source: (Steen, 2005)  
  However, as man is involved in all three, it is vital that man’s inherent 
limitations are considered (Steen, 2005).  The limitations include his/her knowledge, 
skills, physical and mental strength, judgements and decision making. The 
environment includes internal and external items.  The internal environment consists 
of working conditions that may affect his/her reaction.  Vibration, noise, humidity and 
the temperature fall under the internal environment, whereas political, cultural and 
economical factors fall under the external environment.    
 
To ensure adequacy of knowledge and the skills of seafarers,  
attempts are made by STCW 95 to set up a competency-based system so that 
seafarers may use their ability to apply them (knowledge and skills) in different 
situations (Potts & Holder, 2007).  An effect of this has led to a high degree of 
specialization of individuals that respond to individual responsibilities/accountability.  
For example, engineer officers will usually cover only the machineries that are 
assigned under their jurisdiction thus their knowledge and skills will be limited to 
those that are assigned under them.  This limitation has made these officers 
interdependent on others in the workplace. 
 30  
   
  Physical and Mental strength as regards to STCW 95 Code A, 
Section VIII must be adhered to.   Judgement and decision making is a skill and like 
any skill, it may be honed through practice, by reducing cognitive (connected with 
thinking or conscious mental processes) load through practice, the more skilled will 
be less stressed in threatening situations (Fuazudeen, 2008).  However, judgement 
can be impeded through other human traits such as emotions, ego or temperament. 
Many companies are trying to reduce these human errors by adding in more modern 
technologies, but more technology does not remove the potential of human errors, it 
merely relocates or changes it (Dekker, 2006).  
 
3.6.  Impact of Technology on Engine Room Crew 
   
  Over the last two decades shipboard technology has changed 
extensively mainly in the form of automatic controls which demand higher and 
updated skills from seafarers (R. Prasad, 2008).  Beside these demands technology 
has had other impacts on the daily operations in the engine room.  The widespread 
use of automation has allowed substantial reduction in manning to be made.  Ships 
continued to be automated at an increasing rate with the introduction of periodically 
unattended machinery spaces and integrated bridge control systems which 
facilitated ‘one man on watch’ operations so that today, in some ships, there are 
crews numbering as few as six (Bucknail & Freire, 2003). 
   
  Unmanned machinery spaces have become the norms in many ships 
with watch keeping being carried out by machinery control and surveillance systems.  
Systems have also been fitted to allow engine diagnostics to be carried out remotely 
at the equipment suppliers.  The main factor limiting further crew reductions by 
increasing automation onboard appears to have shifted from technology to the 
ability of seafarers to cope with a working routine where limited onboard 
companionship, aggravated by a life style of working watches and very short port 
stay has a commonplace (Bucknail & Freire, 2003).  Hence, the social life onboard 
has declined. 
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  Technology has shaped and influenced the way in which engine crew 
make errors.  It has also affected the crew’s opportunities to detect or recover from 
the errors they make and thus, in certain cases, accelerated their journeys towards 
breakdown.   With the limited amount of man power and stringent regulations 
coupled with an extensive amount of paper work has put more stress and strain on 
seafarers rather than relief.  To obtain the views of current and earlier operations, 
questionnaires were sent out to ascertain the views of seafarers about the problems 
they had onboard with their machineries and the use of a CBT simulator as a 
training aid; the responses came with different views as shown in the next section. 
 
 
3.7.   Views of Seafarers on Technology  
    
  The purpose of the questionnaire is explained in Chapter one and a 
copy is provided in Appendix I-A, whereas, responses to the questionnaire are seen 
in Appendix II.  The questionnaire is in two parts: (a) Problem with the Machineries 
and (b) CBT as training aid.  To gain a comprehensive view the questionnaire was 
sorted into the three management levels onboard namely the Management, 
Operational and Support level. 
   
  The objective of this research was to find a common problem that 
almost all operators within the engine room working with the various machineries 
faced and to develop a question so as to ascertain from the manufacturers if they 
can develop software to be used on a CBT simulator so as to help solve some of 
these operational problems.  A total of 80 copies of the questionnaire were 
distributed amongst WMU students with engine room experience and institutions in 
Europe, Africa, Asia and the United States.  Finally, the total number of  received 
responses were 35 with the following distribution: 
  Management Level          -          10 
  Operational Level            -           13 
  Support Level           -      12  
  Total       -            35 
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From the various responses, it was found that the machineries had common related 
problems,   which ranged from minor to highly technical.   
   
  There was a unanimous answer at all levels regarding CBT onboard 
as a good training aid. On the line of instructions provided by the CBT, many agreed 
that it was easy and almost all were familiar with the CBT simulator.  However, there 
was a mixed response about the time allocated for Senior Officers to help train 
Junior Officers; two thirds of those responding agreed that time should be three 
hours monthly. 
   
  Hence, the question posed to the manufacturers is: can software be 
developed or is it already available for CBT simulator for training and maintenance 
purposes simulating trouble shooting of the following engine room machineries: 
turbocharger of the M/E, governor of the A/E, Centrifugal pumps, Purifiers, Air 
compressors, Safety valves of the boilers and the 15ppm monitor of the OWS?  
   
3.8.   The Role of Technology in MET Institutions 
   
  The problem of assessing engine room safety goes far beyond 
technology, crew size or the ISM Code but also extends to the basis of training 
which starts at the maritime institutions.  With appropriate training, organizational 
innovations and ergonomics design, new vessel technology should not degrade 
safety.  The Training programs need to change as new technology is adopted (NRC, 
1990), hence, a look at the role of technology at MET institutions has to be 
considered. 
   
  Automation has been the major cause for crew reduction but will this 
result in the neglect of essential maintenance?  Or to what extent will automation 
and technology advances improve the reliability of ships’ operating systems?  The 
lack of attention to these concerns will raise the risk of injuries and vessel accidents 
with a social, economic and environmental cost (NRC, 1990).  Today, it can be said 
with some confidence that the introduction of new technology is often the catalyst for 
applied innovation in techniques or methodology.  New technology, of course, may 
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raise  the expectations by those working in the related fields that such developments 
will lead to the accruing of advantage, such as increased productivity, greater 
efficiencies through cost savings, and the sheer excitement of developing new ideas 
and ways of achieving specific objectives (Fisher & Muirhead, 2001). 
   
  Technology continues to change at an ever-increasing rate.  This 
also has an implication on maritime education.  People working in the industry need 
increased skills to operate the new high technology equipment used by the maritime 
sector and there is a training requirement as a result.  At the same time, 
technological improvements in pedagogy now allow maritime training to be delivered 
in a range of different ways, including not requiring students to physically be in a 
classroom.  Use of the Internet, visual/audio CD Rom, simulation laboratories or 
videoconferencing or CDs, for example, enable people to study without having to 
base themselves at an educational institution for extended periods (Otway, 2004).  
In fact, it is difficult for educators to teach without these services.  Many Maritime 
Training Institutions are judged by the educational technologies they offer. 
   
  The training aims of maritime education are to cultivate superior 
shipping management personnel, and the leading industry personnel in the maritime 
technology, to develop innovation abilities and to give birth to the internationalized 
knowledgeable and strategic management personnel.  This vision should not be set 
only on the industrial market but also on the cultivation of practical marine persons 
with the ability and the task of superior seafarer training and should be transferred 
as soon as practicable to  higher vocational education (Xangwen, 2002) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  
 
4.  Route map to safety in the engine room 
   
  The previous chapter established and elaborated on the root causes 
of accidents.  This chapter  focuses on finding solutions to these causes.  Hence the 
route map is there to show how we can achieve this.   
   
  When considering maritime safety, it is necessary to address both the 
human factor and the technical solutions in the broadest sense, not just the 
immediate causes of actual or potential failure (Er & Celik, 2005).  The IMO 
regulations are required to be implemented to ensure safer and secure shipping and 
cleaner oceans, for the setting up of common standards for ship and system design 
and build; for the education and training of the appropriate personnel in the industry, 
and for operational procedures.   Seafarers also need to be protected through 
regulations that can provide them with a safe and secure working environment, 
decent working and living conditions, fair terms of employment and healthy lifestyles. 
   
  Many of the resolutions, conventions, recommendations and 
standards developed by the IMO affect the “Human Element” either directly or 
indirectly.  It is important therefore, to remember that the purpose of regulations is to 
protect the people, machines, systems and the environment from danger, injury, 
damage or destruction.  Human nature is such that we at times break the rules 
either unintentionally through slips, lapses or mistakes; or simply we do not 
understand them.  Furthermore, sometimes breaking the rules may be intentional 
because of commercial or operational pressures force us to cut corners (Alert, 2006).    
The statistics tell us that the majority of accidents are a result of human failings, and 
many can be put down to violations of the rules and regulations.  Therefore, what is 
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the apparent solution to safety? Is it the numerous regulations or the technological 
approach? 
 
 
 
 
4.0.1  The Guidelines for Safe Operations   
   
  Maritime safety regulations save lives (Robe, 2006), they focus on 
lifesaving equipment and crew training and were aimed at improving crew 
survivability after an accident.   
   
4.0.2  SOLAS 
 
   The intent of this convention is to safety of life at sea.  Looking at 
Chapter II-2 (Construction – Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction), part E 
deals with the human element matters such as training, drills and maintenance 
issues, and part F sets out the  methodology for approving alternative design and 
arrangements.   Chapter V-16 features the maintenance of  equipment and Chapter 
IX deals with the management of safe operations of the ship.  
   
4.0.3  STCW 78 as amended   
 
  This convention set up the minimum international standards of 
knowledge, understanding and proficiency in the specified compentencies from the 
viewpoint of safety and pollution prevention (R. Prasad, 2008).   It provides engine 
room watch keeping procedures and safe working practices as related to engine 
room operations.  It provides for three levels of responsibilities namely at  the 
Management, Operational and Support levels.  It has two Codes;  Code A, which is 
mandatory, has the competence tables specifying the standard of knowledge, 
understanding and skills required,  to be developed through theoritical inputs,  
laboratory training, workshops and or by simulator and shipboard training to 
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understand the underlying principles and to perform the work related to watch 
keeeping, operations, faults identification and the maintenance of systems in a safe 
manner including response to emergency operations.  Code B provides 
recommendations and guidance. 
   
  4.0.4  ISM Code  
 
  Since safety involves the management at all levels and engineering 
operations of  systems are underpinned by human factors, the ISM Code was 
adopted by IMO for the intended purpose of management of safety.  The purpose of 
the Code is to provide an international standard for the safe management and 
operation of ships and  prevent marine pollution.  The Code comprises 13 sections 
that cover aspects from safety and environmental protection policies through the 
responsibilities and authority of individual organisations to documentation and 
certification, verification and control.  Through these provisions the ISM Code 
addresses important issues relating to human factors and is one of the most 
significant documents to be produced by IMO (Kuo, 1998).  The starting point is for 
everyone associated with shipping to gain an appreciation of the key issues involved 
in safety. 
   
 
4.0.5  Other Appropriate rules and regulations 
? Conventions, protocols, recommendations, codes guidelines, 
and resolutions, relating to standards of maritime safety, 
efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine 
pollution from ships; 
? Maritime conventions on working and living conditions and 
basic human rights 
? International Regulations for Health and Hygiene 
? Regulations for design, construction and through-life 
compliance with rules and standards 
? Classification society rules for hull structures and machinery 
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  These rules and regulations are all developed with the intention of 
making the maritime industry, and the workers in it, more safe, responsible and 
dependable.  The intentions are all good but the implementation on board is another 
matter.  These regulations on the other hand have made Senior Officers merely 
managers and administrators, who are spending far too much time completing 
paperwork and administrative tasks to satisfy legislation thus lagging behind their 
duties mainly in helping to train their Junior Officers (Cooper, 2006). This distraction 
has caused the Junior Officers and ratings to work and learn in isolation.  For the 
fear of causing an accident, junior officers learn only their assigned duties. There is 
a need to train the Junior Officers and support staff on specific equipment systems 
on board that will expose them properly in safety precaution and routine 
maintenance. Hence to help alleviate such a problem with a CBT simulator should 
be installed in the engine room so as to help with  training  and trouble shoot engine 
room machinery problems. 
 
 
4.1. Finding an Apparent Solution to Engine Room Accidents 
   
  Education is the gradual process of acquiring knowledge through 
learning and instruction.  It is as much about the development of personal attributes 
through upbringing and observation as it is about gaining knowledge through 
textbooks.  It is a lifelong process; we never stop learning.   
   
  Training is the development of skills or knowledge through instruction 
or practice.  If correctly applied, it is a planned systematic development of the 
aptitute, knowledge, understanding, skill, attitude and behaviour pattern required by 
an individual so that he/she can adequately carry out a given task or perform a 
particular job.  The combination of education and training are about the development 
and maintenance of the human component of ship systems.  The compentence of a 
mariner will depend not only on good and effective education and training, but also 
on his/her aptitude, knowledge and understanding of the subject, on the availability 
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of opportunities to develop his/her skills and, ultimately, experience.  Competent 
seafarers make the difference; they make the ship safe (Alert, 2005).  
   
  On the other hand, the burning problem of the lack of “competent” 
manpower is, a result of the industry’s short-sightedness in the policies towards 
tackling human resource issues (Bajpaee, 2006).  Despite, this some ship managers 
and owners are investing substantial sums of money on the latest technology and 
the best training facilities to attract and train young professionals, while others 
continue to wonder about the wisdom of investing time and money in training. 
   
  In a nut shell, the solution to solving this problem is brought down to 
Maritime Education and Training since MET relates to the human element.  It is 
important that all stakeholders encourage and promote the highest standards of 
education and training and a common spirit of professionalism in the industry. The 
industry should not sit back and think that through the increase in automation and 
electronic systems the problems onboard will be easily solved technically.  As 
technology (automation and electronics) is revolutionized so must  the seafarers  
meet these challenges through a continous and effective training chain.  One of the 
best ways to achieve this is through self training with a CBT simulator since 
technology, commercial pressure and drop in crew size has left almost no time for 
the Senior Officers to train the  Junior Officers. 
 
 
4.2.  Integrating CBT Technology into Training in the E/R 
   
  Technological developments cause changes in system concepts and 
operations and thus changes in training needs. Over the years, the traditional 
marine engineering training has transcended into comprehensive computer software 
to be used on computers for the training and assessment of seafarers, first 
appearing at colleges and training centers.  Hence it is more of a reason that such 
training should be enhanced at sea and it is in this regard that a CBT simulator is 
used. 
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  CBT systems are quite straightforward branching systems:  the 
seafarer is presented with some domain knowledge, followed by a number of 
questions or exercises to make sure that he/she has understood the information 
presented and can be applied  in different contexts or environments.  For example, 
the training objective is to teach or test the seafarer to dismantle or assemble a 
centrifugal pump, in this case the program is strictly focused on this task.  It is 
desirable to limit the seafarer’s attention to only those elements of the simulation 
which are relevant.  The errors the seafarer might make are foreseen, and feedback 
or remediation is also pre-programmed (Farmer, Rooij, & Moraal, 1999).  The 
training on CBT should be used to improve the level of proficiency.  The major 
objective of this simulated programme is to achieve a safe and effective operation. 
As a device it offers the potential for improved efficiency in many tasks using the 
mental and physical processes.   
   
  Other multimedia could be used for training onboard, like videos, 
audio, photographs or graphics.   However, CBT is more effective for training and 
education over these other multimedia.  In this respect, videos and the other media 
can only broadcast information which may be effective for limited training and 
education. These often lack one of the major elements required by many individuals 
for effective training and education; a simple hyper-navigation system that allows the 
users to decide where they will go next.  Another major benefit of CBT over other 
multimedia is user interactivity.  This allows the users to delve as far into a subject 
as they wish and can manipulate figures to see the outcome (Hick, 1997).  
   
  What is the reason for integrating CBT technology into the training 
arrangements for engine room equipment and systems?  The inexperienced 
seafarer is likely to make errors of judgement in any practical situation.  The 
consequences of such errors could be costly and catastrophic.  On the CBT 
simulator the seafarer can make errors, and receive extrinsic feedback to assist in  
an improved performance.  Rapid repetition of difficult situations allows a review of 
tactics to take place until a satisfactory conclusion is reached (Cross, 2008).  Some 
tasks cannnot be experienced at sea but with the software installed in the CBT the 
seafarer will be able to carry out such a task.  The integration of CBT technology 
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into training in the engine room is to prepare the seafarer for any real problems on 
any given machinery.  The use of the CBT simulator as a training tool can play a 
vital role in raising the safety standards in the E/R. Furthermore, STCW78/95 
(Chapters III and IV in Part A of the Code) has strongly recommended the 
application of engine room simulators in the teaching and learning process.   
 
 
 
4.3.  Assessing the Safety Measurement of a CBT Simulator 
   
  It has been learnt through experience that the application of 
simulation in teaching complex control systems leads to a better understanding of 
the principles of operation of both the equipment and the systems in comparison 
with traditional education methods.  The application of CBT interactive programs 
plays a very important role.  The CBT interactive program provides familiarisation 
with individual auxiliary machinery and associated systems,  preparing the seafarers 
to better deal with potential emergencies during operations on board (Cwilewicz, 
Tomczak, & Pudlowski, 2004).    In this regard, interviews were carried out during 
this research with students at WMU, instructors at maritime institutions and 
seafarers so as to ascertain the degree to which CBT had assisted them with the 
aspects of  safety.   
   
  Coincidentally, all those that were interviewed also had experience 
with CBT simulators and expressed that CBT had helped them solve numerous 
problems onboard.  One of the marine engineers who is sailing on vessels owned by 
STOLT Nielsen said that he had used CBT onboard also, and that the CBT modules 
are also used to relate to safety procedures for the correct use of various 
machineries. Some interviewees explained that the schematic diagram is not well 
understood as compared to the three-dimensional (3D) presentation given by a CBT 
simulator.   
   
  The application of 3D simulation techiques in teaching the operation 
of complex marine machinery leads to a better understanding of the functioning 
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principles of both the equipment and the systems compared with traditional 
educational methods (eg. schematic diagram)(Tomczak, 2005).  The comparison of 
both is seen in figures 3 and 4.  The 3D can be animated and tracking faults can 
easily be detected. 
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Figure 3: Schematic Diagram F.O. Pump with Variable injection Timing 
          Source:(Manbw, 2007) 
 
     
        
 
           Figure 4: 3D Presentation of F.O. Pump with variable injection timing (VIT) 
 Source: (Manbw, 2007) 
   
  With this assessment, it is proven that the CBT simulator can help in 
the promotion of safety in the E/R.  Hence, if one of the aims of the industry is to 
make shipping safer and promote competency at sea, CBT simulator training is one 
the ways to achieve this since Senior Officers are bombarded with administrative 
work leaving them virtually no time to train Junior Officers.  Moreover, training 
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onboard is mandatory according to STCW 78/95 therefore shipping companies need 
to implement it so as to help prevent accidents.  
 
4.4.  Training onboard an Essential Ingredient to Safety 
   
  Ships have become more technologically advanced, but because of 
the present operational environment of fast turn around and the smaller number of 
staff onboard, seafarers have less time to increase their ship knowledge.  Increased 
bureaucracy has, of course, also added to the fact that Senior Officers have less 
time to actually navigate the ship or to handle the ship’s machinery equipment 
(Mortimer, 2008).  More is expected of them both during their hours of work and 
keeping abreast of extensive maritime legislation. The following example supports 
the need for training normally not available in shore based academics: Scavenge 
space explosion: While discharging in port the second engineer was told by the 
engine room watch that two cylinders of a running auxiliary diesel engine were 
displaying abnormally high exhaust temperatures.  While he was inspecting the 
running engine, the cover of scavenge space suddenly blew out and he suffered 
third degree burns on his hands, arm and legs (SASI, 2008).  Probably, the reason 
for this injury when working onboard and when there is an absence of written or 
operational procedure, the crew is bound to be exposed to danger.  How could this 
accident be avoided?  When equipment or machinery like the auxiliary engine 
shows signs of abnormality or strain it must be stopped immediately and taken off 
load.  It should be investigated by using all available resources onboard.  Proper 
training onboard would have helped also to avoid such accident.  
   
  For safe and efficient operations at sea, ship’s crews must be trained 
so as to improve their operational skills.  Consequently, shipping companies cannot 
avoid training the crew to enhance their safety, behavior standards if they need to 
promote safety and improve economic performance.  Not only should they be 
trained before going to sea, but the seafarers  should also be continuously trained 
on board (Guohua, 1999); merely providing more equipment will not prevent 
accidents.  Improved training and education to operate the equipment safely can 
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help prevent maritime accidents and casualties.  Many agencies and companies are 
looking to simulation as one vehicle to improve mariner competency (NRCS, 1996). 
   
  Humans learn most effectively by being given a chance to undertake 
a task, making a mistake and then correcting it.  However, sometimes the mistake is 
costly.  According to theory, when someone makes a mistake the cause becomes 
firmly fixed within the brain, so the chance of that person repeating the same 
mistake is less.  This process is known as learning by doing and is the reason why 
simulators are much more effective at delivering knowledge and expertise (SASI, 
2007).  Using technology such as the CBT simulator to teach safety will minimize 
some of these accidents, improve efficiency and give the crew the confidence in 
carrying out their duties thus saving companies from unwanted spending. 
 
 
4.5.  Manufacturer’s Prospective   
 
  People have a tendency to blame themselves for difficulties with 
technology but at the same time they do search for causes for specific events.  
Hence, when designing equipment for usage the designer must assume that all 
possible errors will occur and must design it so as to minimize the chance of the 
error in the first place, or its effects once it gets into use.  Errors should be easy to 
detect, they should have minimal consequences and, if possible, their effects should 
be reversible (Norman, 1988).  The designing of programs on CBT is of no 
exception.  The designers have to make the program easily accessible and clearly 
understood so that the users can look at the situation and try to discover how and 
what operation can be done.    
   
  One of the objectives of this research was to gather information on 
the CBT simulator.  As this relates to safety onboard a suitable questionnaire was 
formulated to be answered by the manufacturers; the questions and replies can be 
seen in Appendix C.   From the research it was concluded that almost all the engine 
room personnel had similar problems in handling machineries thus the question 
posed to the manufacturers was: “Can Software be developed or is it already 
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available for CBT Simulator for training and maintenance purposes onboard 
simulating trouble shooting of the following engine room machineries?” 
They were asked to put a check mark in the appropriate box 
Table 4: Machineries  
 Machinery & Parts Available Can be developed Can not be 
developed 
1 Turbocharger of the M/E    
2 Governor of the A/E    
3 Centrifugal Pumps    
4 Purifiers    
5 Air Compressors    
6 Safety Valves of  the 
Boilers 
   
8 15ppm monitor of the OWS    
   Source: Author constructed, 2008    
 The questionnaires were sent to MarineSoft, Seagull and Kongsberg.  
Fortunately, Kongsberg’s reply came soon.  Kongsberg is one of the simulator 
manufacturers and is located in Horten, Norway.  Their products have a high quality 
standard which exceeds the international standard on quality (ISO) 9001.  They try 
hard to put more effort into understanding maritime training requirements including 
the philosophy, methodology and the development of training programs to meet the 
user’s objectives.  This understanding is applied through their design, configuration 
and operation of all their simulators.  
  
  The reply came back from Kongsberg with an affirmative answer and 
with an attached folder: SM-0501-B1 Neptune ERS, indicating that all these 
machineries and parts are being developed and used on the MAN B&W SL90MC 
VLCC-V engine series.   It is a training package that teaches the logical approach to 
fault finding, handling normal and anomalous situations without danger to life or 
equipment and allows the crew member to access varying degrees or levels of 
understanding.  It is designed to meet the demands for the basic operational training 
of junior engineers to carry out fault studies by senior engineers as well as economy 
and optimization studies by the chief engineers.  The training on simulators over the 
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past years proved to be an effective training method especially where an error of 
judgment can endanger life, environment and property.  Hence proper training will 
reduce accidents and improve efficiency, and give the engineers the necessary 
experience and confidence in their job-situation (Kongsberg, 2008).   
   
  Since this software is available, shipping companies should take 
advantage of it and place it onboard for the engine crew’s benefit. Through this 
software the engine crew will gain more training knowledge and skills in handling the 
machineries onboard.    
   
  Training is an essential part of safety and the promotion of it calls for 
an attitudinal change in those who are to implement it, both ashore and onboard.   
Hence, there should be a cognitive approach towards safety and its implementation. 
 
 
4.6.  Collective Approach towards Safety Onboard 
   
  Safety involves the core idea that all marine operations be planned 
and executed so as to ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable that no person or 
property will be exposed to danger.  It is in recognition of this that IMO Resolution A. 
647 (16) deals jointly with the two concepts: safety and environmental protection.  
The main emphasis of the resolution is to promote sound management and 
operating procedures within the industry as a whole in order to ensure safety, 
prevent human injury or loss of life and to avoid damage to property and the marine 
environment (Alleievi, 1991).   
   
  In recent years the high profile casualties which have brought the 
industry into the public eye are primarily the result of organizational and managerial 
failure rather than technical failure. It is a pity that seafarers can not do anything 
about this.    Seafarers have no say in the manning levels and it is at the mercy of 
the owners and managers who are also under relentless pressure to reduce 
operating costs.  There are frequent incidents where watchkeepers have been so 
tired that they are incapable of performing their duties reliably.  Others become 
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preoccupied with other tasks, or rely too much on technology, and they fail to fulfill 
their prime objective to be responsible watchkeepers.  In the event of an accident, 
the final mistake in each case is blamed on the seafarer.  It is a fact that the safety 
of the vessel depends upon the action of those individuals onboard and ashore. 
Management experts argue that operators at the lower end of the organization chart 
have to work within the system which is established for them by their managers, and 
so a good proportion of the mistakes they make are built into the system itself 
(Millican, 1993).  For  good management to exist there must be commitment from 
the top, manifested through the company’s safety and environmental policy, the 
provision of the necessary resources and personnel, the need for good 
communication, methods of reporting accidents, concise guidance and instruction 
on safe operations and pollution.  In brief, education and training in the management 
of marine safety and environmental protection is of crucial concern.   
   
  The last two decades have seen a tremendous improvement in the 
design and equipment of ships. Today, it can be said with some confidence that the 
introduction of new technology onboard ships is often the catalyst for applied 
innovation in technique or methodology.  New technology, of course, may raise the 
expectations of those working in the related field that such developments will lead to 
the accruing of advantages, such as increased productivity, greater efficiencies 
through cost saving, increased employee motivation and job satisfaction, the 
creation of innovative concepts and ideas, and sheer excitement of developing new 
ideas and ways of achieving specific objectives (Muirhead, 2004).   The value of 
training the crew must be understood by those with the desire to get the best of their 
money’s worth. The absence of it (training) can lead to disaster onboard, especially, 
when the industry is in an era of multicultural manning which demands a particular 
understanding and a sophisticated level of skilled people.   
    
  It is good to see a companies making the most of their own facilities 
onboard to run training on a regular basis (Seaways, 2004).   A genuine spirit of 
teamwork requires people to help each other to make sure that mistakes are not 
made, and this means being open to advice and criticism (Millican, 1993) without 
fear or favors.  Safety onboard can not be the responsibility of the seafarers alone 
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but the collective effort of safety involves the administration, ship owners, shipyards, 
insurance companies, manufacturers and classification societies.  With a cohesive 
effort safety onboard can be established. 
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Chapter Five 
               
 
5.  Cost Analysis 
 
  Using CBT onboard as a training tool has been proven in the last 
chapter as helpful, however it comes with a price.  Therefore one needs to know the 
cost and its analysis.  This Chapter will focus mainly on the cost, risk assessment 
and quality assurance of training on CBT brings to the industry. 
 
 
5.0.1 The Company 
   
  It is a known fact that companies need to take active steps to develop 
and train their crews so as to improve their performances, skills and knowledge.  But 
the question is why, when shipping is like any other business is about maximizing 
profit?  Rather than measuring the cost of education and training inputs by the 
prices paid for them, the whole concept measures them by the value they would 
have in their most profitable alternative use.  The logic behind this is that since the 
company has a limited supply of economic resources to use in any given period, a 
decision to use some of them for specific purposes, such as education and training, 
means sacrificing the opportunity to spend these same resources on something else 
(Coombs & Hallak, 1987).  In short, the cost analysis is not only to compare cash 
but it helps the company to see the various options and trade-offs available to them 
clearly, and assesses their relative merits and feasibility.  In chapter three it was 
explained that many companies try to reduce human error by adding in more 
technologies, but in the end the result is that human error still remains or is 
relocated.  The cost analysis of new technologies could be traded off by educating 
and training the seafarers in handling these new technologies.  However, it is 
impossible to erase the money paid for training.  Training costs money and the 
question that must always be asked is: Is training cost effective?  The answer to this 
question is left to the company to decide whether to train or not to train as a 
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business decision.  In effect the company must consider training as an investment 
and therefore it must establish what the return on that investment (ROI) is. 
 
5.0.2 Cost of Not Training versus Cost of Training 
   
  For a company to make a business decision in favour of training, it 
must be able to show that not-training costs more money.  It is like a famous saying 
that if one thinks education is expensive let him/her try ignorance.  For example if an 
engineer is not well trained in overhauling a turbocharger on the auxiliary engines 
he/she may cause serious damage to an engine and sometimes disable the ship.   
The cost of not training can lead to customer dissatisfaction and increase the 
number of complaints, increase crisis/incidents and accidents, under-utilise  
technology; low morale and a lack of commitment to the company (Angas, 1995).  
The cost of training gives good and effective performance.  It improves the 
knowledge and skills of the crew in their ship board operations.   Figure 6 shows the 
benefit of Training: 
         
    Figure 5:  Benefits of Training:  
Source:(Mitchell, 1998) 
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  The training of crew improves safety standards and efficiency, both of 
which are vital.  An untrained seafarer would be a liability to others and to himself, 
especially in emergencies (Vanchiswar, 1996). 
 
 
 
5.0.3 The Administration 
   
  The Administration is referred to as the flag state.  What has the 
administration to lose when it does not consider the financier of the ship?  Lets us 
remember that cost analysis is not only about cash but also the sacrifice or the trade 
off.  Hence, the administration shall take such measures for ships flying its flag as 
are necessary to ensure safety at sea with regard to the construction, equipment 
and seaworthiness of ships; the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training 
of crews, taking into account the applicable international instruments; and the use of 
signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions are 
upheld according to article 94 (UNCLOS).  Violation of such an international 
convention could make the flag state lose its credibility. The trade off here is for the 
administration willingness to have a trained and competent crew onboard, thus 
keeping a good reputation internationally as being safe administration than to be 
considered less safe hence losing its credibility.   According to the Nautical 
Institute’s memorandum on maritime safety, published in 1987, governments have 
the authority for safety.  If they fail to discharge their duties effectively, they add 
legitimacy to fraudulent acts of non-compliance with international conventions 
(Seaways, 2001). The idea of installing CBT onboard to help in training the crew is 
of immense benefit to the company and administration. It is a cost saving over 
attending class room training, in spite of the capital cost.   
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5.0.4 The Seafarers 
   
  The seafarers here are referred to as the operators of the daily 
activities onboard the ship.  A well trained, skilful, knowledgeable and competent 
crew makes a safe ship.  The final beneficiary of training onboard is the seafarer.  
Therefore, what part of the cost benefit analysis does the seafarer have to play?  
Operational competitiveness and commercial pressures have led to the adoption of 
contemporary technology on board for faster turn around and also provided an 
opportunity to replace manpower with technology and thus reduce the size of the 
crew on such ships.  Operations with reduced shipboard personnel, however, have 
become the norm in the industry (Rajendra Prasad, 2004).  This has created a need 
for greater knowledge and improved skills for many seafarers to stay at sea.  Hence, 
a seafarer has to do either one of the two: upgrade so as to keep up with modern 
technologies or do nothing and be out of a job.  One way of doing this is to train 
seafarers through special IMO Model Courses.   Many seafarers who would like to 
maintain their jobs would take advantage of upgrading themselves or take 
advantage of their company’s training program if there is one.   However, despite 
these IMO model courses, onboard training is still essential for seafarers to upgrade 
their skills.  These courses are generic as they are shore based. It is up to the 
company to deem whether it is necessary to install a CBT simulator onboard with all 
the requisite software of the machineries onboard installed so as to assist crews in 
dealing with all the potential eventualities. 
 
5.1.   Risk Assessment 
   
  Shipping is an international business.  Like any other business it 
operates under limited resources.  However, using part of the resources to purchase 
a CBT simulator is a calculated risk.  As we have seen in the previous chapters that 
training nowadays in the sea-going environment is somewhat more difficult due to 
time, cost and other availability factors.  The question is why companies should take 
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the risks? Risk is a measure of the severity of the danger which a hazard presents.  
It is a combination of two factors – the Probability of something happening and the 
Consequences if it does (Mitchell, 1998).  Risk assessment is a systematic process 
in which the hazards are identified, the options of managing them assessed and 
then explored.  In the same token, weighing the cost and benefits of the option then 
implementing the best one and finally monitoring and re-assessing the result.   
 
The concentration here is on the CBT simulator.  Is it a risky 
undertaking for a company to purchase?  In this author’s opinion the answer is “no”.  
It is quite a normal practice to solve problems before they occur, instead of 
investigating them afterwards.  In other words, learning from mistakes is fine, but it 
is much better to avoid them.  At sea, the degree for mistake is highly intolerable 
hence training on a CBT simulator is the best option where all mistakes are allowed 
and through training, knowledge and skills are gained to perfection in the given crisis.  
    
  Let us take the new technology in the design of a fuel pump with a 
variable injection timing (VIT) which is meant to economise fuel and also to improve 
the engine’s efficiency at any given load, for instance.   An inexperienced seafarer 
may find it difficult to overhaul and set this pump accurately if he/she has not had 
experience with it.  If a CBT installed onboard has such a module it is a good 
exercise before attempting to overhaul.  It is known that with the improvement in 
technology almost all problems can be solved onboard technically.  It had being 
observed that companies are adding a little bit more technology to help remove 
human errors.  Is this really true?  After all, if technology is there to do the work or to 
monitor the human doing the work, then we have a new problem.  In other words, 
new technology shifts the ways in which the systems break down and it demands 
crew to acquire more knowledge and skills, so as to remember new facts (Dekker, 
2006).  The next point to look at is Time, which is another risk factor in shipping.  We 
know that in shipping Time is of essence.  Due to commercial pressure and other 
factors onboard there is virtually no time allotted to train Junior Officers.  Why then 
should the company purchase a CBT simulator?  Won’t that be a waste of funds?  
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5.1.1  Why Take the Risk? 
   
  Risk will be present as long as ships sail.  The ISM Code 1.2.2.2-.3 
states that the company should “establish safeguards against all indentified risks; 
and continuously improve safety management skills of personnel ashore and aboard 
ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and environmental 
protection.”   This has resulted in efforts to reduce or control risk by all possible 
means, ranging from the redesign of unreliable components, to improvements in 
operational procedures and training.   The result has been a gradual increase in 
safety awareness at all levels of shipping and navigation.  While maritime activity is 
one area where the acceptance of risks cannot be completely avoided, it is also an 
area where the penalties for failure can be high.  Accordingly, the taking of risks 
needs to be carefully weighed against the perceived benefits (Steen, 2005).  Below 
figure 7 shows the Probability against Consequences.  The negligible region is 
where the acceptances of situations which occur infrequently and whose 
consequences are minor, such as near misses.  The other extreme region is the 
intolerable which is very likely to arise and have catastrophic consequences such as 
when the engine crew is overhauling the main engine turbocharger and  does not 
have the requisite experience.   
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    Figure 6: Probability v Consequences  
    Source: (Mitchell, 1998) 
 
5.2.   Risk Treatment by the Company 
   
  Identifying the two points (new technology and time) as risk factors 
an answer can be established to show the risk treatment.  It is left up to the 
company to do either of the four risk treatments that are avoidance, reduction, 
retention and transfer.  Avoidance is not performing an activity that could carry risk. 
For example, not to buy a CBT simulator in order to not take on the responsibility 
that comes alone with it.  Reduction involves methods that reduce the severity of the 
loss or the likelihood of the loss from occurring.  Example is the purchasing of a CBT 
simulator which can demonstrate a sprinkler design of putting out a fire to reduce 
the risk of loss by fire.  Retention is accepting the loss when it occurs.  For example, 
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running machinery without any maintenance plan until it is damaged.  Transfer is 
spreading the risk with other members of the company (Wikipedia, 2007).  
   
  The last two decades have witnessed tremendous changes in 
shipboard technology which demand seafarers have higher and updated skills and 
knowledge to meet the technological demands.  For a company to sit and do nothing 
about training its crews mean that it is taking a high level of risk which involves a low 
level of safety.  On the other hand taking the risks of buying all the necessary 
requirements to help train the crew to meet the demands of the new technology 
means that the risk level is reduced and the safety level is increased. 
   
  The problem is Time; finding the time for Senior Officers to help train 
Junior Officers has been of great concern to the industry.  The advancement in 
technology in the form of automation and controls has reduced the number of staff in 
the engine room. This reduction in manning calls for all hands to be active in 
shipboard operations; commercial pressure and extensive paper work have left no 
time for training onboard.  How should time be allotted for training?  On the other 
hand, just in case the company decides to have CBT for training and the crew can 
not find the time to use it,  a time frame must be established by the company for 
training. 
 
 
5.2.1 Training Time Frame 
   
  During the course of this research, one of the questions in the   
questionnaire was the availability of time.  Many of those in the management level 
answered that they would give three hours of their time weekly to help in training 
their Junior Officers.  This is a clear manifestation that training on board can be 
done only if the company’s policy can allot a means for it.  Part 6 of the ISM Code 
deals with resources and personnel and out of the 7 points stated 6.5 is of major 
concern here.  “The company should establish and maintain procedures for 
identifying any training which may be required in support of the safety management 
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system and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned (ISM, 
2002).”  The ISM Code is mandatory for all ships hence it is imperative that the 
company establishes a training policy and procedure to undertake seafarer training 
(Guohua, 1999). Not allotting time for Senior Officers to help train Junior Officer 
means the Junior Officers will be left on their own to train themselves.  How effective 
will this be when there is no overseer in the training program?  STCW 78/95 Section 
A-I/6.2 emphasizes an overseer and the time allotted for training purposes.  
However, it states that the time for training should not adversely affect the normal 
operation of the ship.  A record of training should be kept according to Section A-
III/1.2.3 of the STCW 78/95 convention.  In addition, the training must have clear 
teaching objectives, carefully designed exercises, clearly understood briefings and 
debriefings for each exercise and there should be some means of measuring the 
effectiveness of the training.   Without these the CBT simulator becomes at best a 
tool with limited effectiveness and at worst an arcade game which might reinforce 
the button-pressing beliefs and misconceptions of the enthusiastic inexperience 
junior officer.  In order words, there is a need for senior officers to set up exercises, 
monitor progress, encourage and guide, evaluate outcomes and debrief the junior 
officers (Murdoch & Holder, 2001). If the company is taking on such a risk by 
purchasing a CBT simulator for training it must open the grounds for managing the 
risk involved. 
 
 
5.3.  Managing the Risks 
 
A ship is a risky place to work and it is incumbent upon ship owners 
and ship managers to develop proper procedures and maintenance programs and to 
ensure that their seafarers are properly trained.  Injuries and fatalities can be 
avoided if the seafarers follow the correct procedures to assess the risk and ensure 
that those risks are minimised by checking that the area in which they are about to 
work is hazard free, and that they are using the correct equipment for the task at 
hand (Snell, 2005).   Ships become a safer environment when the company recruits 
experienced properly qualified, competent officers and crew and gives them 
appropriate amounts of relevant training throughout their careers.  However, 
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whether this is a cost-benefit or a risk in purchasing a CBT simulator, the company 
should realise that technological improvements for the maritime industry are 
evolving at a fantastic rate, fuelled by the desire to improve efficiency and reduce 
the cost of transporting goods. While these changes are impressive, technology 
alone will not be sufficient to reach these goals (Kendall & Buckley, 2001).  Training 
of personnel must be addressed in a proactive manner.  After all, it is the crew 
operating the new equipment who will ultimately determine its efficiency.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 59  
 
Chapter Six 
 
 
6.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
6.1.  Conclusions 
   
  To conclude, it can be said that our lives evolve around perpetual 
changes in standards concerning our daily activities just like education and training.  
The STCW 78 convention as amended had to be revised not only because it lacked 
standards or accuracy but mainly because of the advancement in technology.  “The 
“Standards of Training Certification & Watch Keeping Convention was first agreed in 
1978, and revised in 1995, and is now being re-shaped for the 21st century reflecting 
the radical changes in shipboard technology and training methods over the past 
decade” (Dickinson, 2008).  
   
  However, the STCW Convention cannot and should not be blamed 
for all that goes wrong within the industry such as the competency levels in modern 
shipping.  For example, a member of the support staff was sent to clean a fuel filter 
from one of the auxiliary engines.  After the work was done the member placed the 
filter in position but forgot to take the air out of the system.  When the machinery 
was to be placed online the air got trapped into the system causing a temporary 
blackout.  Another instance, reported by the Nautical Institute states that a junior 
officer was told to get the evaporator running but unfortunately the officer could not 
because he was inexperienced and the instructions contained in the manual were 
not enough to help the officer with the work.   Despite mandatory code A of the 
STCW,  which stipulates the competency level, the instruction manual and diagram 
of the various machineries that should be available onboard ships  are not enough 
to cope with the knowledge required of today’s technologies.  A number of 
accidents/incidents happen in the engine room because of the lack of knowledge 
and skills to work on the machineries of today’s technology.   
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   Technology has advanced beyond man’s imagination causing a shift 
of 90% of the blame of accidents on the human element. The technology of today 
has made the equipment more reliable and efficient but  the problems here rest on 
the companies that is their unwillingness to put money and time into making sure the 
equipments are working  to specification and investing in the training of their crews 
to meet  the require skills in handling these equipments.  That is one of  the main 
reasons why the most part of marine accidents is placed on the human factor and 
the share of such episodes is kept high and even  grow during the last century,. 
Therefore, it is hard to overestimate the importance of the international regulations 
on marine safety matters(Anatoli, 2004). 
    
  In the past, ship owning companies made the master and his crew an 
integral part of the company’s decision making process however, in recent times 
these individuals have become marginalised. Vessels have become micro-managed, 
decisions are being made without consideration of the impact on shipboard staff and 
there is a failure to value the skills, experience and knowledge of those that serve on 
board. Ship’s senior officers have  had a major role in the training of juniors on 
board but with the ships employment pattern with smaller crews on  short contracts, 
the seniors have no time and interest in training their juniors whom they may never 
see again or whom the company may or may not employ again (R. Prasad, 2008).  
Hence, a high turnover of staff and poor levels of motivation are, sadly, not unusual 
in shipping and are often symptomatic of poor management practice.  
   
   However much can be learnt from the ISM Code.  The Code has 
evolved from a long line of quality assurance models that have served many 
industries well.  Although the objective of the Code is safety, the same guiding 
management principles that achieve a safe operation can equally be applied to 
creating a commercially efficient environment, with a culture that attracts, motivates 
and keeps high quality crews.  Section six to the preamble of the Code states: “The 
cornerstone of good management is commitment from the top.  It is the commitment, 
competence, attitude and motivation of individuals at all levels that determines the 
end result.” 
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  When a vessel fails to perform effectively or has an accident the first 
question often asked is: who is to blame?  When a seafarer fails in performing 
his/her duty, the wrong reaction is to blame him or her.  The consequence of 
following the instinct to blame an individual when something goes wrong is 
resentment and ineffective communication.  A barrier is created between those that 
should be working together(Maclean, 2008).  When things go wrong the appropriate 
questions to ask is: Was there appropriate supervision? Was there enough provision 
of adequate resources to do the job? Did the crew member have sufficient training 
and were clear instructions given to do the job? The company should know that 
those who perform the tasks on board on a daily basis are best positioned to 
suggest how shipboard processes can be improved, made safer and more 
commercially cost-effective rather than closing this valuable source of information by 
instructive blame. 
   
  Safety has always been the major factor for the development of 
regulations.  This has now been expanded to the protection of the marine 
environment and more recently, maritime security.  These developments, however, 
have raised concerns about whether or not they are having the right effect on the 
shipping industry.  These regulations will always have ‘pros and cons’ but it is the 
shipping industry, and especially the seafarers who are burdened with all the 
requirements.    
 
  As explained in chapter three, the general accident statistics within 
the shipping industry show that about 80% of maritime accidents can be attributed to 
the human element.  If all aspects including the design and ergonomic 
arrangements are taken into account it can be said that the influence of human is in 
fact 100%.   Since the machine is designed; built and operated by man thus a failure 
of the machine is really the failure of man.  Looking at an accident, it is normally a 
number of occurrences and circumstances which lead to a point where an accident 
could not be prevented.  In the strict sense these human failure functions comprise 
not only of a human being in a given situation acting wrongly or neglecting to act, 
but  also about all that which directly or indirectly has contributed to the occurrence, 
such as imperfections in the vessel, for instance in its construction and equipment,  
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deficiencies in the shipboard management or in the administration of the shipping 
company through faulty motivation or attitude towards maritime safety matters within 
the shipping company, inadequate education and training and wrong 
manual/instructions etc., contributing to the error promoting situations. The wrong 
designs or constructions are beyond the seafarers’ ability to change but through 
better skills he/she can redeem their adverse effects.  These better skills are 
attainable through effective training onboard.  
   
  As explained in chapter four, ships are becoming more 
technologically advanced thus increasing in electronics for controls and monitoring, 
in the operation of ships.  These rapid technological developments promote reduced 
manning and call for new specific knowledge and abilities of these lesser number of 
seafarers.  With this in mind, many companies are thinking this will reduce human 
error by adding more modern control technologies.  However, such electronic 
controls in the form of automation do not really remove the potential from human 
error rather they merely relocate or change it to different skill requirements. There is 
little point of spending thousands of dollars in state-of-the-art automated systems if 
there is no training in place as to how to use if effectively. The Modern ship 
demands quality seafarers and training is a vital element in achieving this aim.   
   
   In order to attain a consistent level of training and minimum 
standards of competency across the industry, it is necessary to ensure that the 
relevant competencies can be gained by the development of specific training and 
certification requirements. In a nut shell, the solution to solving this problem is 
brought down to Maritime Education and Training since MET relates to the human 
element.  It is important that all stakeholders encourage and promote the highest 
standards of education and training and a common spirit of professionalism in the 
industry.  The companies should not sit back and think that the increase in 
automation and electronic systems can easily solve the problems onboard 
technically.  As technology (automation and electronics) has revolutionized the 
shipboard systems so must the seafarers so as to meet these challenges through a 
continuous and effective training chain onboard.  One of the best ways of achieving 
this is through self training with CBT simulators since additional technology, 
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commercial pressure and the drop in crew size has left almost no time for senior 
officers to train junior officers.   
 
   That is, if the software of the machineries is easily available on CBT 
simulators for training and trouble shooting this will easily reduce the accident rate 
onboard.  It will also alleviate some of the problems of senior officers training junior 
officers and cost effective as many companies are not in the position to train their 
crew ashore.  The system will bring in a form of standardized operation on the 
machineries of that particular ship and also assist the crew in the familiarization of 
the various machineries.  This system (CBT simulation) will help in supplementing 
the manual instruction and the various diagrams of the vessel’s engine system.   It 
can be recalled that Kongsberg Maritime did it for MAN B&W 5L90 MC VLCC L111-
V product therefore it can be done.   
 
  However, industry should bear in mind that seafarers are human and 
they are likely to make errors, sometimes in judgements and other practical 
situations where the consequences of such errors sometimes could be costly and 
even catastrophic.  The idea of having a CBT simulator is to help build up their 
practical skills in handling their machineries thus reducing the chances of error 
occurring.  As known, on the CBT simulator the seafarer can make errors, and 
receive extrinsic feedback to assist in improving performance.  The rapid repetition 
of difficult situations allows a review of tactics to take place until a satisfactory 
conclusion is reached.  Some tasks cannot be experienced at sea but with the 
appropriate software installed on the CBT the seafarer will be able to carry out the 
assigned task.  Placing CBT technology into training in the engine room is to 
prepare the seafarer for any real problems on any given machinery.  The use of the 
CBT Simulator as a training tool can play a vital role in raising the safety standards 
in the E/R.  Furthermore, STCW 95 (Chapters III and IV in Part A of the Code) has 
strongly recommended the application of engine room simulators in the teaching 
and learning process.  Training is expensive but the cost of not training is even more 
expensive as explained in chapter five.  Providing effective training to the crew 
creates added confidence and improves performance, motivation and reliability.  In 
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any case, if simulators are recommended for classrooms the industry should extend 
it further at sea through CBT since the sea is the final result from the Institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.  Recommendation 
   
  Training using modern technology is often done in practice by on-the-
job experience, but this research has shown that this may compromise the integrity 
of watchkeeping.  Therefore, to enhance training, mariners need to learn how to 
work the system, not just how the system works.  The most realistic way is to train 
seafarers through a self learning process which is through the help of the CBT 
engine room simulator.  Operationally, realistic scenarios should be used for 
seafarers to learn how to use a system’s new capabilities. 
 
  Ship owners should be expedient in installing CBT simulators 
including all the necessary software of the design of that ship’s machineries to be 
installed onboard, not only for training but also for trouble shooting.  The CBT 
simulator should be installed during the building of the ship. This means a close co-
operation between the builders and the manufacturers of simulators will be needed.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I  Research Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Dear Colleagues, 
 
 I am doing my dissertation on CBT simulators in the Engine Room as one of 
the substitutes in helping to train, solve operational problems and promote safety on 
board. 
 
 The reasons for doing this dissertation are due to the numerous problems of 
accidents and breakdowns of machineries in ship operations.  Moreover, the 
shipping industry over the last decade has been exposed to advance technologies 
causing quick turn around and need for smaller crew hence leaving no time for 
training on board which is an essential component for competence development. 
 
 In this light, I would be very grateful, if you as ship operators could assist me 
by answering the following questions so as to support my dissertation.  You can rest 
assure that all questions and answers that you give will be purely confidential.  You 
can also give your feedback without stating your name for confidentiality purposes. 
 
 
I would highly appreciate it, if the questions could be answered by the earliest 
possible time and sent by electronic mail to me (s08071@wmu.se) or 
jboyharvey2003@yahoo.com. 
 
Thanks in advance 
 
John F. Harvey Jr. 
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Appendix I-A  Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
1.       The listed items below from A-G are machineries in the Engine Room;        will 
you please list at least three operational problems you have experienced with each 
one of them doing your sea term. 
 
 
(A)   Main Engines ______________  (B) Auxiliary Eng. _____________ 
   ______________    _____________ 
   ______________    _____________ 
 
(C)   Evaporator ______________   (D) Purifiers  _____________ 
   ______________    _____________ 
   ______________    _____________ 
 
(E)   Compressors ______________    (F)   Boilers _____________ 
             ______________   _____________ 
    ______________   _____________ 
 
 
(G)   Oily Water Separator __________ 
    __________ 
    __________ 
 
2.        The problems that you have listed; do you think, training supplemented with 
practical hands on, could have helped solve some of these problems? 
 
             Yes                 No 
 
 
  
3. If your answer to question 2 is yes, what’s your idea about CBT  simulator 
been on board as a training tool? 
 
               Excellent          Good            Bad            Not Sure 
 
 
4. If you have chosen the first two answers in question 3; how much time 
 will you as a senior Operator put into training your junior Operator? 
  
               Three hours weekly         Three hours monthly          Unsure 
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5. How familiar are you with CBT Simulator? 
 
 Very Familiar First Time   Not Familiar       N/A 
 
6.        Did you have any problems in using CBT Simulator? 
                 Yes                No         N/A 
 
7.        How are the instruction procedures with CBT simulator? 
 
                 Difficult          Easy           Flexible         N/A 
 
8.        To what extent has the CBT simulator training being helpful in your         
 practical training? 
                                        
                 Very helpful           Helpful             Not helpful          N/A 
 
9.        What is your level of responsibility in your Organization? 
           Management  Operational       Support         N/A  
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Appendix II  Respond to the Questionnaire 
 
 
 
1.       The listed items below from A-G are machineries in the Engine Room;   will 
you please list at least three operational problems you have experienced with each 
one of them doing your sea term. 
 
 
(A)   Main Engines Fuel  Systems   (B) Auxiliary Eng. Fuel  Systems 
   Cooling  System    Power Balance 
   Starting  System    Lub  system 
 
(C)   Evaporator Low production   (D) Purifiers  Full Seperation 
   High salinity                Gravity disc 
   Vacuum Loss     Bowl cleaning 
 
(E)   Compressors Low  Output        (F)   Boilers  Smoke  density
   Foul  Coolers                Water quality 
   Carbon deposits    Automation 
 
 
(G)   Oily Water Separator  Oily water interface 
     3 way v/v operation 
     15 ppm alarm 
 
2.        The problems that you have listed; do you think, training supplemented with 
practical hands on, could have helped solve some of these problems? 
 
             Yes                 No 
 
 
  
 
 
3. If your answer to question 2 is yes, what’s your idea about CBT  simulator 
been on board as a training tool? 
 
               Excellent          Good            Bad            Not Sure 
 
 
4. If you have chosen the first two answers in question 3; how much time 
 will you as a senior Operator put into training your junior Operator? 
  
               Three hours weekly         Three hours monthly          Unsure 
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5. How familiar are you with CBT Simulator? 
 
 Very Familiar First Time   Not Familiar       N/A 
 
6.        Did you have any problems in using CBT Simulator? 
                 Yes                No         N/A 
 
7.        How are the instruction procedures with CBT simulator? 
 
                 Difficult          Easy           Flexible         N/A 
 
8.        To what extent has the CBT simulator training being helpful in your         
 practical training? 
                                        
                 Very helpful           Helpful             Not helpful          N/A 
 
9.        What is your level of responsibility in your Organization? 
           Management  Operational       Support         N/A  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75  
 
Appendix III  Letter to the Manufacturers 
 
   
 
      
 
 
        June 2, 2008 
 
 
Dear Sir: 
 
 I am a student at the World Maritime University (WMU), specializing in 
Maritime Education and Training.  I am carrying on a research for my dissertation 
relating to CBT simulator for the Engine Room (E/R) machineries and equipments 
systems as one of the substitutes in helping to train, solve operational problems and 
promote safety onboard ships. 
 
 The reasons for doing this dissertation are due to the numerous problems of 
accidents and breakdowns of machineries in ship operations.  Moreover, the 
shipping industry over the last decade has been exposed to advance technologies 
causing quick turn around and need for smaller crew hence leaving no time for 
training on board which is an essential component for competence development. 
 
 The survey was carried out through operators from various localities with 
Engine Room Sea going experiences.  From the results, it was observed that they 
all had a common problem in handling the machineries onboard.   
 
 Hence in this regards, I would like from you as a manufacturer of Simulator 
to please answer the following question so as to support my position in my 
dissertation.  Please find on the next sheet the question. 
  
 I would highly appreciate it, if the question could be answered by the earliest 
possible time and sent by electronic mail to me (s08071@wmu.se) or 
jboyharvey2003@yahoo.com. 
 
Thanks in advance, 
 
John F. Harvey 
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Appendix III-A 
 
 
Can software be developed or is it already available for CBT simulator for 
training and maintenance purposes onboard simulating trouble shooting of 
the following engine room machineries? 
 
Please put a check mark in the appropriate box. 
 Machinery & Parts Available Can be developed Can not be 
developed 
1 Turbocharger of the 
M/E 
   
2 Governor of A/E    
3 Centrifugal Pumps    
4 Purifiers    
5  Air Compressors    
6 Safety Valves on the 
Boilers 
   
7 15ppm monitor of the 
OWS 
   
 
Comment:        
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Appendix IV  Kongsberg Maritime’s Respond 
 
 
Good morning Mr. John F. Harvey  
 
Your questions is answered and a product description of a simulator. VLCC man-
b&w mc 90 to give you some information about our simulators. 
 
 
Can software be developed or is it already available for CBT simulator for 
training and maintenance purposes onboard simulating trouble shooting of 
the following engine room machineries?  
 
Please put a check mark in the appropriate box.  
 Machinery & Parts  Available  Can be developed  Can not be 
developed  
1  Turbocharger of the 
M/E  
yes   
2  Governor of A/E  yes   
3  Centrifugal Pumps  yes   
4  Purifiers  yes   
5  Air Compressors  yes   
6  Safety Valves on the 
Boilers  
yes   
7  15ppm monitor of the 
OWS  
yes   
 
 
 
(See attached file: SM-0501-B1 Neptune ERS MAN B&W 5L90MC VLCC L11-V 
Product Dâ€|.pdf) 
 
Best regards 
 
Leif Pentti Halvorsen 
Product Adviser 
O&M Simulation & Training, 
 
Kongsberg Maritime AS 
Phone: +47 33032610 
Mobile: +47 48084663 
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Appendix V  CBT Workstation 
 
 
         
 
            Figure 7  CBT Workstation   
Source:  (Cross, 2008) 
 
